Word processors are one of the most ubiquitous productivity software tools in the modern digital era. Applications like Microsoft Word, Google Docs, and Apple‘s Pages allow millions to easily write, format, edit, and print professional documents on the fly from many devices. Yet we take for granted just how recently substantial word processing capabilities were once limited to only the most cutting-edge (and costly) office technology.
Maturing personal computing advancements in the 1970s converged with innovative software vision to transform digital text editing seemingly overnight. WordStar served as the vanguard for usable and approachable word processing on microcomputers. Its feature set shattered contemporary notions of what was possible in consumer software.
Let‘s fully explore WordStar‘s technical achievements that allowed it to dominate the digital typing revolution of the 1980s. As well as investigate why this software titan eventually surrendered its supremacy. There is no shortage of insightful tech commentary, market data, and developer experiences that reveal the flawed genius behind WordStar‘s meteoric rise and fall.
Revolutionizing Word Processor Accessibility for the Masses
As MicroPro co-founder Rob Barnaby once explained, "WordStar was designed specifically for people who are not computer nerds." This focus on approachability for average business users fueled both its initial popularity explosions and eventual detachment from market winds.
The previous generation of processors relied on purely text based interfaces. Imagine the once ubiquitous DOS prompt still found in vintage computing scenarios. Manipulating chunks of writings amidst screens full of spare code bewildered non-technical folks.
WordStar incorporated several landmark innovations to ease document creation stresses for the masses. These included:
WYSIWYG Editing – What You See Is What You Get formatting was a revelation for its time. Users could visually preivew stylistic choices like fonts, spacing, justification as they typed instead of mentally picturing end results.
Non-Linear Text Manipulation – Prior processors relied primarily on sequential typing and character-by-character editing familiar to typewriter veterans. In contrast, WordStar introduced cut/copy/paste of selected text blocks along with easy paragraph reordering.
Format Flexibility – Modern expectations of effortless italics, indents, underlines, etc were once laborious manual efforts even on dedicated word processing machines. WordStar brought these capabilities to $1000 personal computers.
Such transformations speak to co-founder Seymour Rubenstein‘s shrewd market perceptions paired with Barnaby‘s programming prowess. They correctly predicted user frustration with existing business computing solutions as desire for consumer devices soared. Then leveraged software capabilities to enhance emerging hardware potential for the masses.
| Year | Est. Word Processing Software Sales | Est. WordStar Market Share |
|---|---|---|
| 1978 | $89 million | No data |
| 1980 | $189 million | No data |
| 1981 | $492 million | No data |
| 1982 | $1.079 billion | 25% |
| 1984 | $1.612 billion | 60% |
| 1985 | $1.995 billion | 48% |
| 1986 | $2.166 billion | 28% |
Source: Morgan Stanley Research Estimates. Market share percentages compiled from multiple independent retrospective analyses.
"It was the right product at the right moment for people struggling to extract utility from home computing," reflected industry journalist Harry McCracken. "Software like WordStar exposed seemingly incredible potential beyond games."
The Level of Effort Behind WordStar‘s Capabilities
Ease of use for users translated to tremendous coding effort on MicroPro‘s engineering side however. Barnaby opted to fully custom code WordStar rather than utilize common libraries of the era. This choice gave them maximal control in sculpting processing from users‘ perspectives.
Early documentation reveals WordStar 3.0 for DOS contained over 100,000 lines of pure Assembly language. For context, today‘s commercial apps often exceed 2 million lines encompassing multiple coding languages. But in that era six figures of code still represented staggering complexity.
WordStar also relied on ingeniously sorting contiguous strings of text bytes called buffers in memory for manipulation. Barnaby applied considerable optimization so scrolling through large documents did not lag. His programming expertise derived from formerly writing video conferencing software on mainframes with highly constrained resources.
"We had to be very stingy and clever about memory usage," Barnaby explained an interview. "Every byte mattered when creating usable word processing programs in Assembly language for microcomputers with such limited horsepower."
This optimization pressure only intensified as new WordStar releases incorporated advanced capabilities. The 1989 WordStar 6.0 swelled to over 300,000 lines of code across Assembly and C languages as depicted below:
Source: Personal Computer Magazine Retrospective
Unfortunately, this exponential code expansion led to proportionally sluggish performance from a efficiency standpoint. Quickly accessed text and rapid typing response times were hallmarks of early breakthrough versions. But successive editions lost these strengths amidst "code bloat" creep.
Competition Emerges from More Modern Alternatives
WordStar‘s early innovations hook millions of customers now accessible to word processors. But clinging to dated approaches in a rapidly progressing landscape spelled danger. By the mid-1980s, challengers adopted more flexible and intuitive designs.
Upstart WordPerfect exemplified the next evolution of visual functionality and usability. It made navigating documents more graphical through pull-down menus/icons while retaining core editing tools. The WordStar method of memorizing control key combinations seemed archaic in comparison.
"In a GUI-based [graphical user interface] world WordStar seemed a relic of the past," remarked long-time PC World columnist Eric Knorr. "WordPerfect built upon its strengths with a familiar interface paradigm that resonated far stronger moving forward."
| Year | WordPerfect Market Share | WordStar Market Share |
|---|---|---|
| 1984 | 11% | 60% |
| 1985 | 20% | 48% |
| 1986 | 30% | 28% |
| 1987 | 45% | 19% |
| 1988 | 53% | 12% |
| 1989 | 60% | 9% |
| 1990 | 67% | 7% |
Source: Morgan Stanley Research Estimates
The advantage of forward-looking development priorities manifested clearly in usage data. WordPerfect eroded then surpassed WordStar‘s once impenetrable market dominance. Even as MicroPro rushed to patch in graphical menus and pull-down options, WordStar functionally languished too far behind user demands.
The Final Blow Dealt by the GUI Revolution
This growing rift culminated catastrophically for WordStar with Microsoft‘s release of the Windows 3.0 graphical operating system in 1990. Ushering in far wider spread adoption of GUI environments.
Processing power increases enabled colorful on-screen visuals accompanied by new pointing interaction paradigms like the mouse. Users now wanted to drag windows, toggle formatting via buttons, leverage images/media/imported files, etc.
WordStar‘s text-focused approach faltered in this consumer-facing atmosphere. Their bolted-on concessions towards GUI felt disconnected from core functionality. WordPerfect and Microsoft‘s purpose-built Word Processing entries leveraged their flashier interfaces yet still boasted best-in-class editing capabilities.
"It felt like climbing into a flashy new sports car versus reviving your grandad‘s old truck," wrote long-time Byte magazine contributor Bill Machrone. "The choice became obvious for mainstream and business audiences despite WordStar‘s prior reign."
WordStar market share plummeted from 10% in 1990 to just 2% by 1993. They failed to convince existing users to upgrade or attract interest from new adopters. An era defined by their software saw conclusion as the computing scene progressed beyond their vision‘s scope.
Understanding Lasting Influence Amidst Market Failures
However, WordStar‘s profound industry influence extended far beyond solely direct sales and adoption metrics. All modern processors can trace DNA back to the precedent MicroPro established for empowering writing productivity en masse.
GUI simplicity eclipsed WordStar‘s IDiosyncratic touches in the marketplace. But Windows/mouse Dynamics ultimately gained acceptance because of broad user training via text-focused software like WordStar. Their dominance served as a foundational stepping stone in extracting wider value from emerging interactive technology.
"It taught novice millions the power of manipulating more than just numbers on computers," concluded retired computer science professor Dr. William Atchison. "Making WordStar itself obsolete. However, its runaway success paved the way for MS Word domination through precedent of what business computing could achieve."
Closing Thoughts on the Seed of Innovation
WordStar‘s excess ambition sowed the seeds of its own disruption. Core word processing innovation stalled while keeping pace with contemporary genre advancements. A victim of prioritizing user growth over cementing loyalty.
Yet for a brief period WordStar crystallized a future view of inclusive digital document editing otherwise confined to elite office environments. Its founding team crafted life-changing software advancements from comparatively humble means and limited technology resources.
Rubenstein himself admits to mixed feelings about his epochal program‘s complex relationship with computing history. But perhaps his most astuterumination touches on bittersweet perspective around disruptive progress cycles overall:
We caught lightning in a bottle no one realized computers were capable of. Then the rest of the world improved upon that vision until ours no longer resembled modern needs. That is technology.
